Spaceman Spiff
Well-known member
L'inflation c'est built in dans notre système économique. Comment ça peux être autrement quand le but du jeu c'est de faire plus d'argent trimestre après trimestre?
Faut sourire pour les grosses industries quand ça peux justifier d'augmenter le prix pour un bien ou service (woah! hausse de revenus! So much wow! Bonne gestion! ) mais faut être ferme quand les travailleurs penses que ça leur donne le droit de demander plus pour leur main d'oeuvre en retour. "Hey whoa, vous allez faire monter l'inflation!"
Fucking pièce de théatre pour faire plaisir au monde qui ont mit des beau concepts sur papier dans des livres. SUffit de le le télégraphier d'avance pour être sur le monde qui ont le plus de controle sur les leviers peuvent en tirer profit.
Les compagnies utilisant l'excuse de l'inflation et des problèmes de supply chain pour faire des profits records ont plus contribué à la hausse des prix que les salaires ou un chèque de 500$ du gouvernement mais ça a l'air qu'il ne faut pas en parler.
Quant aux salaires, leur impact est assez minime par rapport au reste:
Atypically fast recent wage growth has not been a driver of inflation
Nominal wage growth since early 2021 has been rapid if one only compares it with its own growth over the past two decades. However, atypically fast nominal wage growth in the past 15 months has not been a significant driver of inflation. To explain why, it helps to draw on previous work that examined nominal wage growth targets that would be consistent with the Fed’s 2% long-run inflation target.
Essentially, if the Fed wants 2% inflation, this implies that nominal wages can grow in the long run at roughly 3.5–4%. This is because 2% inflation means that all per-unit costs (including wages) can grow by 2%. But ongoing growth in productivity—output produced in an hour of work—allows the same costs to be spread over more output, which will drive down costs per unit produced. Add in 1.5–2% trend productivity growth, and nominal wages can grow at 3.5–4% annually with prices growing 2% annually.
In the middle and later stages of recoveries, this nominal wage growth target can rise even further. Generally, the labor share of income falls sharply in the early stages of recoveries, as output growth recovers but wage growth remains muted by high unemployment. For this labor share to recover pre-recession levels, nominal wages must rise faster than the sum of inflation and productivity growth for a long stretch of time in the middle and late phases of recoveries.
If policymakers today targeted a return to pre-pandemic labor share, this would require having the labor share of income rise by roughly 6 percentage points. This means that nominal wages could grow at 1% above the long-run nominal wage target for about six years and still be consistent with 2% inflation, as long as this happened with the labor share returning to its 2019 level (a notably unambitious goal). This means wages could grow at a 4.5–5% rate and still be consistent with just 2% inflation.
In last week’s jobs report, growth in average hourly earnings over the last quarter was 4.4% (at an annualized rate). The last three months have seen wage growth slow, with changes averaging just 3.8% (at an annualized rate). In short, nominal wage growth in recent periods is not screaming hot even by the very conservative gauge of what’s consistent with 2% price inflation.
Another way to look at the relationship between nominal wage growth and inflation is to assess what level of inflation is consistent over the long run with the pace of nominal wage growth we’ve seen over the past year. Over this time, nominal wage growth has reached as high as 5.5–6% for short time periods. Assume for a second that there was no improvement in the labor share of income over this time and that all the “excess” nominal wage growth (relative to the recent past) fed directly into price inflation. If nothing else in the economy had changed except this atypically fast nominal wage growth, we’d have inflation today of about 4-4.5%, not the 8.6% we saw over the past year.
But, in fact, the labor share of income actually has recovered about 1 percentage point over this time, so some of the nominal wage gains have not fed directly into price inflation. This means that even the 5.5–6% peak wage growth of the recent past should only be associated with inflation of about 3–3.5%.
In short, the wage data show that the vast majority of price inflation has not so far been driven by fast wage growth, and that wage growth is already showing signs of decelerating. In a recent blog post, we undertook sort of the reverse exercise, showing that measured corporate profits explain an outsized share of recent price changes in the current recovery.
https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-growth-has-been-dampening-inflation-all-along-and-has-slowed-even-more-recently/