The agreement is the result of the two countries` determination to « end the conflict and confrontation that have so far weighed on their relations. » He designed the steps to be taken to further normalize mutual relations and also defined the principles that should govern their future relations.    Despite UN requests for intervention by Pakistani envoys Maleeha Lodhi, The Secretary-General`s spokesman said: Stéphane Dujarric, in a statement: « The Secretary-General also recalls the 1972 agreement on bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, also known as the Simla Agreement, which stipulates that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir must be settled by peaceful means. , in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (iii) Withdrawals will begin as soon as this agreement comes into force and will be completed within 30 days.  In the end of Shimla, Gandhi became a swing factor between the postures of strength and accommodating. The alternative of calling Bhutto`s bluff and leaving without agreement, Gandhi and Haksar were deemed too expensive after India`s dramatic triumph in 1971. The self-limitation that underpinned India`s attitude was all too noticeable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their negotiator, later noted that « India`s excessive fear of avoiding the failure of the talks at all costs has become its great handicap, » while it held « all the negotiating tokens. » Haksar later noted that « force negotiations » are part of the diplomatic currency. But negotiating with someone weak is even more difficult. What the Simla agreement did not achieve for India could have been achieved through the 1973 Delhi Agreement, signed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Simla agreement reads as a communiqué rather than a peace agreement with a country that had waged war on India. Nothing in the agreement has put Pakistan in a state of good behaviour in the future. It also contained some ridiculous expectations, such as the clause that required both governments to « take all measures within their power to prevent hostile propaganda against each other. » The actual negotiations began on 28 June 1972 and lasted five days, with India clinging to the approach of Dhar, in which the return of prisoners of war and Indian-occupied territory was part of a set of permanent agreements on the formal delimitation of the Kashmir border. At the inaugural session on 28 June, Mr Dhar made it clear that the conclusion of a peace settlement was an « essential » condition for the repatriation of prisoners of war. On June 29, he sought a clear framework.
Any « consensual wording » should be consistent with the current situation and « capable of implementing. » Dhar stressed that « the world is moving quickly towards bilateralism. » Mr. Ahmed, however, offered minimal commitments and sought to maintain the old UN-centred conflict resolution framework. Haksar also stressed that India and Pakistan should « solve our own problems » without « including distant countries in our disputes. » On 30 June, Dhar suffered a mild heart attack, with Haksar taking the lead for the rest of the summit. However, India`s momentum in the negotiations remained consistent. The Delhi Agreement on the Return of War and Civilian Internees is a tripartite agreement between these states, signed on 28 August 1973. The agreement was signed by Kamal Hossain, the Foreign Minister of the Government of Bangladesh, Sardar Swaran Singh, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Pakistani government.    In the hope of saving an agreement, Bhutto directly called Gandhi. During the climate meeting, Gandhi stressed the main advantage of the Indian proposal in Kashmir – neither side was forced to physically abandon the territory or exchange populations.