Russia invades Ukraine - Putin announces anexation of Crimera into Russian Federation

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Ukrainian Parliament just passed a vote to ask US, UK, France, China and Russia for protection within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum and international agreements

[h=2]Ukraine requests to special monitoring missions
[/h] During the closed session of the Verkhovna Rada deputies adopted an appeal to the parliaments of the guarantors of security of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum and to international organizations.
The project got treatment at the disposal LB.ua. MPs supported it unchanged.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances

According to the memorandum, Russia, the USA, and the UK confirmed, in recognition of Ukraine becoming party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in effect abandoning its nuclear arsenal to Russia, that they would:

Respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders.
Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine.
Refrain from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its politics.
Seek United Nations Security Council action if nuclear weapons are used against Ukraine.
Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against Ukraine.
Consult with one another if questions arise regarding these commitments.



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http://www.thenation.com/article/178344/distorting-russia#

Stephen F. Cohen: Leaked Tape Suggests U.S. Was Plotting Coup in Ukraine


The degradation of mainstream American press coverage of Russia, a country still vital to US national security, has been under way for many years. If the recent tsunami of shamefully unprofessional and politically inflammatory articles in leading newspapers and magazines—particularly about the Sochi Olympics, Ukraine and, unfailingly, President Vladimir Putin—is an indication, this media malpractice is now pervasive and the new norm.

There are notable exceptions, but a general pattern has developed. Even in the venerable New York Times and Washington Post, news reports, editorials and commentaries no longer adhere rigorously to traditional journalistic standards, often failing to provide essential facts and context; to make a clear distinction between reporting and analysis; to require at least two different political or “expert” views on major developments; or to publish opposing opinions on their op-ed pages. As a result, American media on Russia today are less objective, less balanced, more conformist and scarcely less ideological than when they covered Soviet Russia during the Cold War.

The history of this degradation is also clear. It began in the early 1990s, following the end of the Soviet Union, when the US media adopted Washington’s narrative that almost everything President Boris Yeltsin did was a “transition from communism to democracy” and thus in America’s best interests. This included his economic “shock therapy” and oligarchic looting of essential state assets, which destroyed tens of millions of Russian lives; armed destruction of a popularly elected Parliament and imposition of a “presidential” Constitution, which dealt a crippling blow to democratization and now empowers Putin; brutal war in tiny Chechnya, which gave rise to terrorists in Russia’s North Caucasus; rigging of his own re-election in 1996; and leaving behind, in 1999, his approval ratings in single digits, a disintegrating country laden with weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, most American journalists still give the impression that Yeltsin was an ideal Russian leader.

Since the early 2000s, the media have followed a different leader-centric narrative, also consistent with US policy, that devalues multifaceted analysis for a relentless demonization of Putin, with little regard for facts. (Was any Soviet Communist leader after Stalin ever so personally villainized?) If Russia under Yeltsin was presented as having legitimate politics and national interests, we are now made to believe that Putin’s Russia has none at all, at home or abroad—even on its own borders, as in Ukraine.

Russia today has serious problems and many repugnant Kremlin policies. But anyone relying on mainstream American media will not find there any of their origins or influences in Yeltsin’s Russia or in provocative US policies since the 1990s—only in the “autocrat” Putin who, however authoritarian, in reality lacks such power. Nor is he credited with stabilizing a disintegrating nuclear-armed country, assisting US security pursuits from Afghanistan and Syria to Iran or even with granting amnesty, in December, to more than 1,000 jailed prisoners, including mothers of young children.

Not surprisingly, in January The Wall Street Journal featured the widely discredited former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, branding Putin’s government as one of “deceit, violence and cynicism,” with the Kremlin a “nerve center of the troubles that bedevil the West.” But wanton Putin-bashing is also the dominant narrative in centrist, liberal and progressive media, from the Post, Times and The New Republic to CNN, MSNBC and HBO’s Real Time With Bill Maher, where Howard Dean, not previously known for his Russia expertise, recently declared, to the panel’s approval, “Vladimir Putin is a thug.”

The media therefore eagerly await Putin’s downfall—due to his “failing economy” (some of its indicators are better than US ones), the valor of street protesters and other right-minded oppositionists (whose policies are rarely examined), the defection of his electorate (his approval ratings remain around 65 percent) or some welcomed “cataclysm.” Evidently believing, as does the Times, for example, that democrats and a “much better future” will succeed Putin (not zealous ultranationalists growing in the streets and corridors of power), US commentators remain indifferent to what the hoped-for “destabilization of his regime” might mean in the world’s largest nuclear country.

Certainly, The New Republic’s lead writer on Russia, Julia Ioffe, does not explore the question, or much else of real consequence, in her nearly 10,000-word February 17 cover story. Ioffe’s bannered theme is devoutly Putin-phobic: “He Crushed His Opposition and Has Nothing to Show for It But a Country That Is Falling Apart.” Neither sweeping assertion is spelled out or documented. A compilation of chats with Russian-born Ioffe’s disaffected (but seemingly not “crushed”) Moscow acquaintances and titillating personal gossip long circulating on the Internet, the article seems better suited (apart from some factual errors) for the Russian tabloids, as does Ioffe’s disdain for objectivity. Protest shouts of “Russia without Putin!” and “Putin is a thief!” were “one of the most exhilarating moments I’d ever experienced.” So was tweeting “Putin’s fucked, y’all.” Nor does she forget the hopeful mantra “cataclysm seems closer than ever now.”

* * *

For weeks, this toxic coverage has focused on the Sochi Olympics and the deepening crisis in Ukraine. Even before the Games began, the Times declared the newly built complex a “Soviet-style dystopia” and warned in a headline, Terrorism and Tension, Not Sports and Joy. On opening day, the paper found space for three anti-Putin articles and a lead editorial, a feat rivaled by the Post. Facts hardly mattered. Virtually every US report insisted that a record $51 billion “squandered” by Putin on the Sochi Games proved they were “corrupt.” But as Ben Aris of Business New Europe pointed out, as much as $44 billion may have been spent “to develop the infrastructure of the entire region,” investment “the entire country needs.”

Overall pre-Sochi coverage was even worse, exploiting the threat of terrorism so licentiously it seemed pornographic. The Post, long known among critical-minded Russia-watchers as Pravda on the Potomac, exemplified the media ethos. A sports columnist and an editorial page editor turned the Olympics into “a contest of wills” between the despised Putin’s “thugocracy” and terrorist “insurgents.” The “two warring parties” were so equated that readers might have wondered which to cheer for. If nothing else, American journalists gave terrorists an early victory, tainting “Putin’s Games” and frightening away many foreign spectators, including some relatives of the athletes.

The Sochi Games will soon pass, triumphantly or tragically, but the potentially fateful Ukrainian crisis will not. A new Cold War divide between West and East may now be unfolding, not in Berlin but in the heart of Russia’s historical civilization. The result could be a permanent confrontation fraught with instability and the threat of a hot war far worse than the one in Georgia in 2008. These dangers have been all but ignored in highly selective, partisan and inflammatory US media accounts, which portray the European Union’s “Partnership” proposal benignly as Ukraine’s chance for democracy, prosperity and escape from Russia, thwarted only by a “bullying” Putin and his “cronies” in Kiev.

Not long ago, committed readers could count on The New York Review of Books for factually trustworthy alternative perspectives on important historical and contemporary subjects. But when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, the NYRB has succumbed to the general media mania. In a January 21 blog post, Amy Knight, a regular contributor and inveterate Putin-basher, warned the US government against cooperating with the Kremlin on Sochi security, even suggesting that Putin’s secret services “might have had an interest in allowing or even facilitating such attacks” as killed or wounded dozens of Russians in Volgograd in December.

Knight’s innuendo prefigured a purported report on Ukraine by Yale professor Timothy Snyder in the February 20 issue. Omissions of facts, by journalists or scholars, are no less an untruth than misstatements of fact. Snyder’s article was full of both, which are widespread in the popular media, but these are in the esteemed NYRB and by an acclaimed academic. Consider a few of Snyder’s assertions:

§ ”On paper, Ukraine is now a dictatorship.” In fact, the “paper” legislation he’s referring to hardly constituted dictatorship, and in any event was soon repealed. Ukraine is in a state nearly the opposite of dictatorship—political chaos uncontrolled by President Viktor Yanukovych, the Parliament, the police or any other government institution.

§ ”The [parliamentary] deputies…have all but voted themselves out of existence.” Again, Snyder is alluding to the nullified “paper.” Moreover, serious discussions have been under way in Kiev about reverting to provisions in the 2004 Constitution that would return substantial presidential powers to the legislature, hardly “the end of parliamentary checks on presidential power,” as Snyder claims. (Does he dislike the prospect of a compromise outcome?)

§ ”Through remarkably large and peaceful public protests…Ukrainians have set a positive example for Europeans.” This astonishing statement may have been true in November, but it now raises questions about the “example” Snyder is advocating. The occupation of government buildings in Kiev and in Western Ukraine, the hurling of firebombs at police and other violent assaults on law enforcement officers and the proliferation of anti-Semitic slogans by a significant number of anti-Yanukovych protesters, all documented and even televised, are not an “example” most readers would recommend to Europeans or Americans. Nor are they tolerated, even if accompanied by episodes of police brutality, in any Western democracy.

§ ”Representatives of a minor group of the Ukrainian extreme right have taken credit for the violence.” This obfuscation implies that apart perhaps from a “minor group,” the “Ukrainian extreme right” is part of the positive “example” being set. (Many of its representatives have expressed hatred for Europe’s “anti-traditional” values, such as gay rights.) Still more, Snyder continues, “something is fishy,” strongly implying that the mob violence is actually being “done by russo-phone provocateurs” on behalf of “Yanukovych (or Putin).” As evidence, Snyder alludes to “reports” that the instigators “spoke Russian.” But millions of Ukrainians on both sides of their incipient civil war speak Russian.

§ Snyder reproduces yet another widespread media malpractice regarding Russia, the decline of editorial fact-checking. In a recent article in the International New York Times, he both inflates his assertions and tries to delete neofascist elements from his innocuous “Ukrainian extreme right.” Again without any verified evidence, he warns of a Putin-backed “armed intervention” in Ukraine after the Olympics and characterizes reliable reports of “Nazis and anti-Semites” among street protesters as “Russian propaganda.”

§ Perhaps the largest untruth promoted by Snyder and most US media is the claim that “Ukraine’s future integration into Europe” is “yearned for throughout the country.” But every informed observer knows—from Ukraine’s history, geography, languages, religions, culture, recent politics and opinion surveys—that the country is deeply divided as to whether it should join Europe or remain close politically and economically to Russia. There is not one Ukraine or one “Ukrainian people” but at least two, generally situated in its Western and Eastern regions.

Such factual distortions point to two flagrant omissions by Snyder and other US media accounts. The now exceedingly dangerous confrontation between the two Ukraines was not “ignited,” as the Times claims, by Yanukovych’s duplicitous negotiating—or by Putin—but by the EU’s reckless ultimatum, in November, that the democratically elected president of a profoundly divided country choose between Europe and Russia. Putin’s proposal for a tripartite arrangement, rarely if ever reported, was flatly rejected by US and EU officials.

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But the most crucial media omission is Moscow’s reasonable conviction that the struggle for Ukraine is yet another chapter in the West’s ongoing, US-led march toward post-Soviet Russia, which began in the 1990s with NATO’s eastward expansion and continued with US-funded NGO political activities inside Russia, a US-NATO military outpost in Georgia and missile-defense installations near Russia. Whether this longstanding Washington-Brussels policy is wise or reckless, it—not Putin’s December financial offer to save Ukraine’s collapsing economy—is deceitful. The EU’s “civilizational” proposal, for example, includes “security policy” provisions, almost never reported, that would apparently subordinate Ukraine to NATO.

Any doubts about the Obama administration’s real intentions in Ukraine should have been dispelled by the recently revealed taped conversation between a top State Department official, Victoria Nuland, and the US ambassador in Kiev. The media predictably focused on the source of the “leak” and on Nuland’s verbal “gaffe”—“Fuck the EU.” But the essential revelation was that high-level US officials were plotting to “midwife” a new, anti-Russian Ukrainian government by ousting or neutralizing its democratically elected president—that is, a coup.

Americans are left with a new edition of an old question. Has Washington’s twenty-year winner-take-all approach to post-Soviet Russia shaped this degraded news coverage, or is official policy shaped by the coverage? Did Senator John McCain stand in Kiev alongside the well-known leader of an extreme nationalist party because he was ill informed by the media, or have the media deleted this part of the story because of McCain’s folly?

And what of Barack Obama’s decision to send only a low-level delegation, including retired gay athletes, to Sochi? In August, Putin virtually saved Obama’s presidency by persuading Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to eliminate his chemical weapons. Putin then helped to facilitate Obama’s heralded opening to Iran. Should not Obama himself have gone to Sochi—either out of gratitude to Putin, or to stand with Russia’s leader against international terrorists who have struck both of our countries? Did he not go because he was ensnared by his unwise Russia policies, or because the US media misrepresented the varying reasons cited: the granting of asylum to Edward Snowden, differences on the Middle East, infringements on gay rights in Russia, and now Ukraine? Whatever the explanation, as Russian intellectuals say when faced with two bad alternatives, “Both are worst.”
 
"Suggest plotting a coup" isn't exactly an uber positive endorsement.

If you dig far enough, I'm pretty sure you will find american plans to plot coups in just about any country on this planet. Just in case.

Doesn't mean necessarily they act on it.

But hey, this is the world 2.0 - everybody says everybody plots against everybody else.

Who the fuck are we supposed to believe now... The first casualty of a war is the truth. Truer now than it ever was in history.
 
Ukranian interior ministry says it received information of a planned provocation where forces posing as Ukrainian military will kill a few Russian, uh we mean unmarked, troops tonight (our afternoon). Sorry, I don't have any English news about this.

http://24tv.ua/home/showSingleNews....ayinskih_viyskovih__mvs_video&objectId=416174

http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/03/crimea3/

Likewise, the Russian ministry of interior says it also expects a provocation tonight against the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Not much we can do except wait :/

In other news, along the border of eastern Ukraine (not Crimea) Russian jets have entered Ukrainian air space and Russian tanks were seen rolling up to the border and backing away repeatedly. IMO, you do that if you want to test reactions.
 
what happened in the Ukraine was a coup, though.

It sure was. But by whom?

Not certain at all it was the americans. What happened there did not require extraordinary means - just a fed up populace.

Like the arab spring. Just because a coup happens, it doesn't automatically mean it was the americans. It is not South America or the 50's anymore... It could be the EU, it could be an internal Ukraine thing. Most likely we will know a decade after the war ends...;)
 
It sure was. But by whom?

Not certain at all it was the americans. What happened there did not require extraordinary means - just a fed up populace.

Like the arab spring. Just because a coup happens, it doesn't automatically mean it was the americans. It is not South America or the 50's anymore... It could be the EU, it could be an internal Ukraine thing. Most likely we will know a decade after the war ends...;)

Yea but it's just so easy to blame the USA
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/pressure-rising-as-obama-works-to-rein-in-russia.html

The Russian occupation of Crimea has challenged Mr. Obama as has no other international crisis, and at its heart, the advice seemed to pose the same question: Is Mr. Obama tough enough to take on the former K.G.B. colonel in the Kremlin? It is no easy task. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany told Mr. Obama by telephone on Sunday that after speaking with Mr. Putin she was not sure he was in touch with reality, people briefed on the call said. “In another world,” she said.

Scary.
 
It looks like the west will turn its back to the Ukraine. That'll work... After all, it worked in 1938 Czechoslovakia.

Chamberlain.Munich.jpg
 
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/03/03/le-coup-de-force-de-poutine-en-crimee

Arnaud Dubien, directeur de l'Observatoire franco-russe et chercheur associé à l'IRIS, a répondu à vos questions sur les enjeux que représentent la crise ukrainienne pour la Russie.

Visiteur : Quel est le but de Poutine ? Annexer la Crimée, l'est de l'Ukraine ou faire pression et faire du chantage à l'Europe ?

Il s'agit d'une prise de gage territorial de la part de la Russie, à ce stade de la crise ukrainienne. La Russie a perdu la précédente manche politique, avec le renversement de Ianoukovitch et la prise du pouvoir à Kiev par des éléments majoritairement russophobes. Elle crée donc un nouveau rapport de force en se situant sur le terrain militaire, sans doute dans la perspective de négociations avec les Occidentaux.

Le rattachement de la Crimée à la Russie est en effet une option d'autant plus crédible que la population locale y est favorable. Disons que les Russes ethniques composent plus des deux tiers de la population. Il y a 10 % à 15 % de Tatars (minorité musulmane turcophone). Le reste de la population étant composés d'Ukrainiens, de juifs, de Grecs, etc.

Pour ce qui est des régions méridionales et orientales de l'Ukraine, les tendances séparatistes ne sont pas majoritaires. La population de ces régions situées à l'Est d'un axe Odessa-Kharkiv se sentent ukrainiennes, bien que majoritairement russophones. Elles ne suivront vraisemblablement pas le sécessionnisme criméen, mais elles ne se reconnaissent pas dans les forces politiques qui ont pris le pouvoir à Kiev. Or, ces régions représentent la moitié de l'Ukraine et l'essentiel du potentiel économique du pays y est concentré.



Perdro05 : En quoi la perte de la Crimée serait-elle si importante pour l'Ukraine ?


La perte d'un territoire pour tout Etat indépendant n'est jamais un événement anodin, quelle que soit la taille potentielle de ce territoire. C'est d'autant plus vrai pour l'Ukraine, car c'est un Etat fragile, aux frontières dessinées récemment. L'Ukraine est indépendante depuis 1991 seulement. La Crimée n'a été rattachée à l'Ukraine soviétique qu'en 1954. Je rappelle que cela a été décidé à l'époque par Nikita Khrouchtchev. Il s'agissait alors pour lui de célébrer le tricentenaire du rattachement de l'Ukraine à la Russie.

La Crimée est aussi, pour l'Ukraine et la Russie, un verrou stratégique, qui commande l'accès à la mer Noire. L'éventuel détachement de la Crimée serait moins pour l'Ukraine une perte économique qu'un signal politique extrêmement inquiétant.

a_bundgaard : La Crimée dispose-t-elle des moyens de vivre en autarcie sur le territoire ukrainien, avec le seul soutien des Russes ?

C'est une vraie question. Il faut rappeler que la Crimée est une presqu'île avec un accès extrêmement étroit et facilement contrôlable. Elle dépend pour ses approvisionnements en eau et en électricité du reste de l'Ukraine. On sait que l'une des questions actuellement discutée par les responsables russes et criméens est précisément celle d'approvisionnements énergétiques directs depuis la Russie.

On a vu également ce matin à Moscou que le premier ministre Medvedev avait donné instruction de mettre en œuvre la construction d'un projet ancien qui est celui de la construction d'un pont entre la Crimée et la Russie. Après, il y aurait continuité territoriale. Il faudra évidemment du temps pour construire ce pont, mais le signal est important.

a_bundgaard : Pour justifier une possible intervention, les autorités russes ont mis en avant les risques pesant sur la sécurité de leurs compatriotes en Ukraine. Qu'en est-il réellement ?

Il faut être très clair. Il n'y a pas eu, en Crimée, d'incidents visant des citoyens de Russie ou des populations russophones qui pourraient justifier une intervention militaire. En revanche, il est évident que l'arrivée au pouvoir à Kiev de certains éléments extrémistes (comme le parti ultranationaliste Svoboda, qui s'est distingué en 2009 par une campagne d'affichage en vue de la réhabilitation de la division SS Galicie) était une ligne rouge pour Moscou.

Des partisans de Svoboda, le 27 février devant le Parlement, à Kiev.

Guy : Donc, c'est un coup de force de Poutine uniquement pour agrandir son territoire et garder sa base militaire à Sébastopol ?

C'est un coup de force, oui. Ce n'est pas encore la guerre puisqu'aucun coup de feu n'a été tiré à ce stade. Je crois qu'il s'agit plus d'un signal adressé aux Occidentaux. Un signal de refus du changement de régime par la force à Kiev et de refus de voir cette « nouvelle Ukraine » se rapprocher de l'OTAN [Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord].

Je pense que ce que souhaite Poutine est une grande négociation sur l'Ukraine avec les Occidentaux. Il reste que ce modèle diplomatique avec prise de gage territorial est plus caractéristique de la fin du XIXe siècle que du XXIe siècle.

Hubert : Est-ce que les menaces de sanctions et surtout l'exclusion du G8 peuvent faire reculer la fédération russe ? Et, dès lors, comment les Occidentaux parleraient avec la Russie ?

Pour ce qui est du G8, le sommet qui devait se tenir en juin à Sotchi paraît compromis. Ceci étant, tous les membres du G8, notamment l'Allemagne, ne souhaitent pas exclure la Russie de ce format. Je doute que les menaces d'exclusion du G8 soient de nature à émouvoir Vladimir Poutine.

Il faudra par ailleurs que des sanctions économiques soient envisagées par l'Union européenne. Cela paraît extrêmement douteux à ce stade. Les sanctions sont de toute façon à double tranchant. Elles affecteraient le cas échéant nos entreprises en Russie. La Russie pour la France est le troisième marché d'exportation hors Europe.



John : L'Europe peut-elle se passer du gaz russe ? Si oui, à quelle échéance ?


Certainement pas. De même que la Russie ne peut pas se passer des rentes liées aux exportations de gaz vers l'Union européenne. Plus que de dépendance, il faut parler d'interdépendance sur ce sujet.

François : Ne risque-t-il pas d'y avoir des tensions en Europe entre tenants de la ligne dure (Pologne, pays baltes) et partisans de l'apaisement (France, Allemagne) ?

Depuis l'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale en 2004, on a en effet observé des divergences parfois fortes entre la « nouvelle Europe » et la « vieille Europe » sur la Russie. Depuis la normalisation entre Varsovie et Moscou en 2010, ces divergences tendaient à s'atténuer. Le risque aujourd'hui est de voir ressurgir une fracture entre les partisans d'une ligne dure de containment de la Russie (une ligne portée par la Pologne et la Suède entre autres), venant de pays qui sont depuis plusieurs siècles en rivalité avec la Russie à propos de l'Ukraine, et entre d'autre part, les partisans d'une approche réaliste des rapports de force en Europe orientale. Il serait souhaitable que des voix raisonnables, notamment française et allemande, se fassent entendre sur ce dossier.

Saint-Jours : On peut comprendre que la Russie veuille conserver la Crimée. Mais pourquoi intervenir militairement ? Une bonne négociation avec Kiev aurait abouti en ce sens sans les inconvénients politiques et économiques qui vont en résulter pour la Russie. Erreur ou faiblesse véritable de Poutine ?

La Russie ne considère pas les autorités à Kiev comme légitimes, donc il ne peut pas y avoir de négociations avec elles. La Russie juge par ailleurs que l'objectif stratégique du nouveau pouvoir ukrainien est précisément de rompre avec la Russie et donc, peut-être, de dénoncer les accords de Kharkiv signés en 2010 sur la flotte de la mer Noire. Ces accords prévoyaient la prorogation jusqu'en 2042 du stationnement de la flotte de la mer Noire à Sébastopol et ailleurs sur la péninsule de Crimée.

Visiteur : Quelle est la position de l'opinion publique russe sur la crise ukrainienne ?

Pour l'instant, nous n'avons pas de sondages. On ne peut donc procéder que de façon empirique. L'immense majorité des citoyens russes considère que la Crimée a toujours fait partie de la Russie et que son rattachement à l'Ukraine était une aberration. Ce qui naturellement ne veut pas dire que la majorité de la population soutiendrait une véritable guerre contre l'Ukraine, qui reste largement perçue comme faisant partie intégrante du « corps russe ».

Le président russe Vladimir Poutine lors d'exercices militaires au large de l'île de Sakhaline, le 16 juillet 2013.

François : Quels risques politiques internes encourt Poutine en poursuivant sa politique agressive, notamment vis-à-vis de l'opposition pro-démocratique et de l'élite économique qui aurait beaucoup à perdre en cas d'isolement ?

Aucun risque de politique intérieure à ce stade. En revanche, les risques économiques sont très forts pour la Russie. Je rappelle que l'Ukraine est le 5e partenaire commercial de la Russie ; que les banques et compagnies russes sont exposées à hauteur de 35 milliards de dollars [25 milliards d'euros] en Ukraine et que la Russie a donc plus à perdre que les Européens et les Américains d'un effondrement économique de l'Ukraine.

Ce qui laisse entrevoir des thèmes de négociation possible avec la Russie. Je maintiens d'ailleurs que le coup de force de Poutine en Crimée n'est pas une fin en soi mais s'inscrit dans une volonté de grand marchandage sur la question ukrainienne.

La crise ukrainienne, qui dure depuis la mi-novembre, est loin d'être terminée. Il y a eu plusieurs séquences. On voit aujourd'hui des manifestations dans les régions de l'est de l'Ukraine et des administrations régionales qui sont prises par des milliers de manifestants pro-russes, à l'image de ce qui s'était passé dans l'ouest et le nord de l'Ukraine fin janvier contre le pouvoir de Ianoukovitch.

Le principal risque pour la Russie comme pour les Occidentaux est de voir l'Ukraine s'effondrer économiquement et devenir ingérable politiquement. Ni les uns ni les autres n'ayant intérêt à ce scénario, les discussions – qui ne manqueront pas de s'ouvrir – porteront certainement sur ces sujets là.

G. Smadja : Est-ce qu'un « homme fort », tel que se présente Poutine aux yeux des Russes, peut accepter de perdre l'Ukraine sans contrepartie ?

Ni Poutine ni aucun dirigeant russe ne peut envisager de perdre l'Ukraine. Que veut dire perdre l'Ukraine ? Il s'agit de cesser pour la Russie d'exercer un rôle stratégique dominant, autrement dit de voir l'Ukraine basculer dans la sphère d'influence de l'OTAN et de l'UE.

En effet, l'Ukraine est un concentré d'intérêts politico-militaires, économiques et identitaires particulièrement forts pour la Russie. La sous-estimation de cette réalité par les Européens est aussi l'un des facteurs expliquant la crise ukrainienne depuis novembre. Il n'y a aucune confiance de la part de Poutine aujourd'hui envers les Occidentaux, du fait notamment du non-respect des accords de sortie de crise qui avaient été signés à Kiev.

Que peut demander Poutine ? Il peut demander aux Européens, et à l'Allemagne en particulier, de faire pression sur le gouvernement à Kiev pour marginaliser les éléments les plus radicaux en son sein. Mais c'est probablement autour des questions économiques, financières, que le fil du dialogue pourrait être renoué, étant entendu que ni l'UE ni la Russie n'ont intérêt à voir apparaître un trou noir à leur frontière.



Harry : Vladimir Poutine ne donne-t-il pas une formidable opportunité à l'Occident pour diminuer l'influence russe ?

C'est un risque. Il y a un risque politique fort en terme d'image, de réputation. Il y a en effet beaucoup de gens qui n'attendaient que cela en Occident. Ceci dit, je pense que le scénario pour l'instant est assez maîtrisé de la part de Poutine, puisqu'aucun coup de feu n'a été tiré en Crimée.

L'expérience montre également que les crises sont surmontées avec le temps : nous pourrions évoquer l'oubli relatif, par exemple, de l'intervention russe en Géorgie ou dans un autre registre, les interventions militaires occidentales sans mandat de l'ONU au Kosovo ou en Irak en 2003.


Visiteur : Comment expliquer le silence de Poutine ?


Poutine n'a pas réagi officiellement et personnellement au renversement du président Ianoukovitch et ce silence masquait, on le comprend maintenant, une violente colère à la fois contre les Occidentaux – qu'il accuse d'avoir orchestré ou soutenu la nouvelle révolution ukrainienne – mais aussi contre ces nouvelles autorités ukrainiennes.

Ceci étant, Poutine a eu des entretiens avec la plupart des dirigeants du G8, ce qui veut dire qu'une certaine forme de dialogue politique est maintenue, même si il ne s'exprime pas publiquement. Il sera très intéressant d'entendre le président russe lorsqu'il s'exprimera et il s'exprimera tôt ou tard sur le sujet.
 
http://www.kresy.pl/wydarzenia,wojskowosc?zobacz/niespodziewane-manewry-w-obwodzie-kaliningradzkim

Russia deploys 3500 troops and heavy equipment on Batlic coast in Kaliningrad Oblat near Polish and Lithuanian borders



http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-poland-idUSBREA210KY20140302

Poland says Russian appeasement not an option: "History shows that those who appease all the time in order to preserve peace usually only buy a little bit of time." Warsaw fears Russia will push west through Ukraine and threaten Poland now.

Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Sunday it was essential to prevent Russia's seizure of Crimea expanding into a wider regional conflict.

"We should be able to stop Russia in its aggressive moves precisely in order to avoid a conflict," Tusk told reporters on Sunday after an extraordinary meeting with party leaders.

But he said doing nothing was also not an option.

"History shows - although I don't want to use too many historical comparisons - that those who appease all the time in order to preserve peace usually only buy a little bit of time."

Poland shares a border with Ukraine and large parts of the western part of the country were Polish before World War Two. Warsaw's foreign policy is driven by a fear of its former overlord Russia pushing west into Ukraine and threatening Poland's own borders.

Poland played an important role in brokering the deal that ended violent conflicts between pro-Europe protesters and the government of President Viktor Yanukovich, a Russian ally, and that led eventually Yanukovich's ouster.

Asked on Sunday if the United States had military options on the table to address the crisis, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry told CBS television that President Barack Obama "has all options on the table."
 
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